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Abstract
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 targets use of 36 billion gallons of biofuels per year by 2022. Achieving
this may require substantial changes to current transportation fuel systems for distribution, dispensing, and use in vehicles.
The U.S. Department of Energy and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory designed a system dynamics approach to
help focus government action by determining what supply chain changes would have the greatest potential to accelerate
biofuels deployment. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory developed the Biomass Scenario Model, a system
dynamics model which represents the primary system effects and dependencies in the biomass-to-biofuels supply chain.
The model provides a framework for developing scenarios and conducting biofuels policy analysis. This paper focuses on
the downstream portion of the supply chain–represented in the distribution logistics, dispensing station, and fuel
utilization, and vehicle modules of the Biomass Scenario Model. This model initially focused on ethanol, but has since been
expanded to include other biofuels. Some portions of this system are represented dynamically with major interactions and
feedbacks, especially those related to a dispensing station owner’s decision whether to offer ethanol fuel and a consumer’s
choice whether to purchase that fuel. Other portions of the system are modeled with little or no dynamics; the vehicle
choices of consumers are represented as discrete scenarios. This paper explores conditions needed to sustain an ethanol
fuel market and identifies implications of these findings for program and policy goals. A large, economically sustainable
ethanol fuel market (or other biofuel market) requires low end-user fuel price relative to gasoline and sufficient producer
payment, which are difficult to achieve simultaneously. Other requirements (different for ethanol vs. other biofuel markets)
include the need for infrastructure for distribution and dispensing and widespread use of high ethanol blends in flexible-
fuel vehicles.
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Introduction
Transportation fuels from biomass (biofuels) are pursued to
achieve multiple goals: reduced petroleum use and greenhouse gas
emissions, fuel oxygenation, and agricultural market diversification
[1,2]. This paper focuses on ethanol. Where real-world systems or
modeled system representation is likely generalizable across all
biofuels, we use the term ‘‘biofuel’’ to be broadly inclusive of all
such fuels, including ethanol. In some cases we refer to ‘‘ethanol or
other biofuel’’ to highlight that this analysis emphasizes ethanol
but the statement in question applies broadly as well. We refer to
‘‘ethanol’’ for items that apply to that fuel only, and we refer to
‘‘ethanol’’ in presenting all results of the analysis because they are
for ethanol specifically.
The U.S. government has a long-standing goal of reduced
dependence on imported petroleum that was initially prompted by
the oil crisis and embargo of 1973. Federal incentives for the
production and use of biofuels have been enacted as one method
to achieve that goal. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
(Public Law 101–549, 42 U.S.C. 7401) and associated fuel
regulations established oxygenation requirements for much of
the nation’s gasoline supply, which oxygenated biofuels such as
ethanol can help meet; these were subsequently supplemented
with renewable fuel requirements [3,4]. More recently, the federal
government has taken judicial, regulatory, and legislative steps to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On April 2, 2007, the Supreme
Court found in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 that greenhouse
gases are air pollutants, resulting in regulatory action to limit
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles [5]. Climate change
legislation has been introduced in Congress [6]. Low-carbon
biofuels can help meet greenhouse gas mitigation goals.
In acknowledgment of the potential contribution of biofuels to
achieving these and other goals, recent policies at the state and
federal levels in the United States have promoted the use of
biofuels, with a long-term focus on ethanol and other biofuels.
Such policies include:
N a federal biofuels research, development, and deployment
program
N preferential tax treatment of biofuels production and sales
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N flexible-fuel vehicle (FFV) value for corporate average fuel
economy compliance
N renewable fuels standards [3,4,7].
Despite this history of policy intervention, biofuels use in the
transportation fuel market remains small (10.7 billion gallons [8])
compared with the 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022 specified
in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).
Challenges to increased use include retail gasoline prices that are
lower than the cost of delivering biofuel to the pump, logistics and
infrastructure requirements for fuel distribution and dispensing,
biomass-to-biofuel conversion cost and capital investment require-
ments, and logistical and market issues of biomass supply. Many of
these challenges arise because the supply chain for biofuels differs
substantially from the supply chain for petroleum-based transpor-
tation fuels [3,7]. Infrastructure-compatible biofuels (non-ethanol)
would mitigate some, but not eliminate all, of these differences.
To analyze such challenges, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory developed
a system dynamics modeling approach that represents the primary
system effects and dependencies in the biomass-to-biofuels supply
chain [9,10]. For purposes of this analysis, the biomass-to-biofuels
supply chain is discussed at the overall industry level and with a
focus on development and evolution of a supply chain for a
developing industry. This is not to be confused with the day-to-day
management of the existing supply chain of an individual firm
working with other individual firms. In this context, the dynamics
in question relate to the development of entire sectors of the
industry on a year-to-year timescale (e.g. how long does it take
production capacity to develop), not to supply chain management
dynamics of individual firms that play out over weeks, days, or
even hours (e.g. how long does it take this part to be shipped). This
approach was designed to support biofuels policy analysis by
determining what supply chain changes have the greatest potential
to accelerate the deployment of biofuels (see Figure 1). In this
paper, we address the ‘‘downstream’’ portion of the supply chain,
including the distribution logistics, dispensing station, fuel utiliza-
tion, and vehicle portions of the chain. The DOE-sponsored
system dynamics model of the biofuels supply chain–the Biomass
Scenario Model–represents major interactions and feedbacks
related to a dispensing station owner’s decision to offer ethanol
fuel, with distribution options and vehicle choice represented as
discrete scenarios.
This paper addresses the downstream section of the supply
chain. The full supply chain is shown in Figure 2; the
downstream end of the chain elaborates on the biofuels
distribution and end-use components that are noted in the
figure. Characteristics of the major components of the
downstream system are summarized in Table 1. For each
linked element in the downstream supply chain (i.e., entries in
the first column), the infrastructure and market conditions
necessary for an economically sustainable industry are listed,
along with policies that can shape these infrastructure and
market conditions. In the Methods section, we describe each of
the supply chain links, infrastructure and market elements, and
policy levers, as well as their representation in the model.
In considering the downstream portion of the biofuels supply
chain, three major analytic questions guide our exploration:
1. Can an economically sustainable domestic ethanol fuel
distribution, dispensing, and end-use system develop, and
under what policy and market conditions?
2. What combination of policies (including carbon policy) appears
most likely to achieve policy goals?
3. How do these conclusions differ under different sets of
assumptions about consumer and system behavior?
We found that an economically sustainable domestic ethanol
fuel distribution, dispensing, and end-use system could develop
under conditions of strong policy intervention or significant
change from current market conditions. Results suggest that, with
sufficient policy intervention (or sufficient market change) across
the supply chain, the policy goals could be achieved. However,
policy intervention or market change relative to today’s conditions
would be necessary: competitive prices at the pump to attract
consumers, financially adequate revenue streams to attract
producers, and the infrastructure to bring the fuel to market are
all necessary elements for a sustainable market, and do not exist at
this time, nor are they envisioned in a business-as-usual situation.
When assumptions about consumer behavior and system behavior
differ, these conclusions generally persist, although substantially
different assumptions affect the level of investment in incentives
that would be required to develop and sustain an ethanol fuel
system.
The remaining sections of the paper will explore these
questions, and possible answers, based on modeling results.
Methods
This Methods section describes each part of the biomass
supply chain and briefly identifies what modules of the Biomass
Scenario Model represent each part. The sections below offer
more detail on how each part of the supply chain is
represented. The Biomass Scenario Model is an analytic model
that uses a system dynamics approach [11]. It is built in
STELLA software [12]. The full model represents dynamic
interactions in the biomass-to-biofuels supply chain, including
the five interdependent systems shown in Figure 2: feedstock
production, feedstock logistics, biofuels production, biofuels
distribution, and biofuels end use [13]. This analysis uses a
portion of the full Biomass Scenario Model, the downstream
model. An analysis that uses the full model is underway and will
explore the broader context for the downstream system
addressed in this paper. The model is not intended to forecast
the future; high-level models (such as the Biomass Scenario
Model) are imprecise and best suited for analysis that focuses on
relationships, interactions, and trends rather than on single-point
Figure 1. Overview of Biomass Scenario Model. The figure shows
the overall purpose and content of the Biomass Scenario Model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g001
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can help identify suspect assumptions and can thereby suggest
agendas for further investigation.
The downstream portion of the biofuels supply chain, and the
corresponding downstream portion of the Biomass Scenario
Model, encompasses a complex physical and market system that
transfers biofuel from biomass-to-biofuel conversion facilities to its
point of use as a transportation fuel. Table 2 shows selected
assumptions that are used in this analysis in the downstream
model.
Biomass conversion to biofuel, which occurs at the upstream
end of the chain, is beyond the scope of our analysis in this report.
In order to depict the co-evolution of the downstream and
conversion systems, we developed a simplified conversion module
in the downstream model. Conversion is represented in greater
detail in the full Biomass Scenario Model.
Figure 2. Supply chain for ethanol fuel with Biomass Scenario Model structure. The full supply chain for ethanol fuel is shown, with the
downstream end labeled. The modules of the Biomass Scenario Model are briefly described. The downstream version of the Biomass Scenario Model
that was used in this paper includes a simplified version of the Conversion Module and the Distribution Logistics, Dispensing Station, and Vehicle
Modules. For simplicity, in the downstream version, the Vehicle Module is used to generate vehicle scenarios, rather than being fully coupled during
each run. E10, E20, and E85 are light-duty vehicle fuels that are approximately 10%, 20%, and 85% ethanol by volume, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g002
Table 1. Infrastructure and Market Needs and Related Policies across the Downstream Supply Chain.
Supply Chain Step Infrastructure Infrastructure Policies Market Conditions Market Policies
Conversion Conversion capacity None Return on conversion
investment
Point-of-production
subsidy
Distribution Tankage, terminal, truck,
pipeline, rail capacity
Distribution and storage subsidy Return on distribution
investment
None
Dispensing High-blend tankage and
dispensing equipment
Repurposing subsidy; fixed capital investment
subsidy
Return on investment in
tankage and equipment
None
End Use Flexible-fuel vehicles Manufacturer incentives; Car Allowance Rebate
System (‘‘Cash for Clunkers’’) or other consumer
incentives for vehicle purchase
Low relative end-use fuel
price
Point-of-use subsidy;
incremental gasoline
cost
The table shows supply chain steps, infrastructure and infrastructure policies at each step, market conditions needed for ethanol market growth or stability, and market
policies that apply at each step.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t001
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system is a challenge. In the case of ethanol it must be kept
separate from gasoline until the distribution terminal because of its
chemical properties. At the distribution terminal, ethanol and
gasoline are blended, and the blend is transported to a dispensing
station (Figure 3).
Truck or rail is generally used to transport ethanol from
conversion facilities to distribution terminals, although at least one
distributor, Kinder Morgan, uses a gasoline pipeline after careful
testing to ensure adequate exclusion of water and oxygen [14]. In
many cases, the current pipeline network is not appropriately
located for ethanol or biofuel distribution. The likely regional
distribution of domestic biofuel production is quite different from
the regional population distribution and associated demand for
transportation fuel, which exacerbates the challenge of developing
a biofuel distribution system. In the Biomass Scenario Model, the
distribution logistics module represents the distribution system (for
more information, see the Distribution Logistics section).
For ethanol or other biofuels marketed at retail, station owners
must decide to offer the biofuel if it is to become more widely
available at the pump. High-blend fuel is a blend of ethanol and
gasoline with a high percentage of ethanol. An example of a high-
blend fuel is E85, which targets approximately 85% ethanol
content by volume. High-blend fuel requires dedicated tanks,
which represent a significant investment for station owners.
Station owners also must consider risks of deciding to offer the
fuel, such as risk of mishap or loss of sales during construction,
liability risks associated with possible misuse of the fuel (i.e., if high-
blend ethanol were used in the wrong engines), and environmental
contamination (i.e., if ethanol mobilized hazardous chemicals from
leaking underground storage tanks). Whether or not the magni-
tude of these risks is significant, station owner perception of risk is
a factor in their decisions. Dispensing stations operate in a very
competitive market with thin profit margins and substantial shares
of revenue from in-store sales. In this context, the choice to
dispense biofuel does not lead to clear economic advantage at this
time [15]. In the Biomass Scenario Model, the dispensing station
module represents the dispensing system.
We adopt an approach to consumer’s choice based on rational
choice theory and model price and availability of retail biofuels as
determinants of consumer choice. While other factors play a role
in choice, consumers are unlikely to seek out biofuels that are more
expensive or require extra driving to obtain [15,16]. Complicating
the understanding of price difference is the fact that ethanol has
lower volumetric energy content than gasoline, and consumer
awareness of this difference varies. The fuel utilization module of
the Biomass Scenario Model represents consumer fuel choice.
Major factors in the downstream system include availability of
vehicles that can use fuel with high ethanol content; a consumer’s
choice to use the fuel; a dispensing station owner’s choice to offer
the fuel; and availability of the fuel within the distribution system.
These factors would be of little or no significance for infrastruc-
ture-compatible biofuels that were blended with regular gasoline
and not marketed separately at retail. Such fuels are being
addressed in a new version of the Biomass Scenario Model that
was not used in this analysis. Federal rules currently allow
conventional gasoline vehicles to use fuel with up to 10% ethanol
content [17]. EPA has partially granted a waiver that would allow
use of gasoline that contains up to 15% ethanol in certain recent
model years of vehicles. The current national level of ethanol use
for transportation fuel is close to 10%. This national level is called
the ‘‘blend wall’’ because this is the maximum amount that can
Table 2. Selected Assumptions.
Item and Description Value Notes
Maximum cellulosic feedstock production and
corresponding ceiling for cellulosic feedstock
price
500 million tons/yr;
$105/ton
The feedstock production is an input assumption based on EISA 2007. The
ceiling price is an input consistent with that production level.
Initial starch ethanol production capacity (Jan. 2006) 5610
9 gal/yr During simulation, production varies in response to price.
Maximum starch ethanol production capacity 15 billion gal/yr Constraint on starch ethanol eligible for federal Renewable Fuel Standard
under EISA 2007.
Maximum cellulosic ethanol production capacity 44 billion gal/yr Based on feedstock production input assumption and an assumed 90 gal/ton
conversion rate (500 million tons/yr690 gal/ton).
Maximum ethanol imports 1610
9 gal/yr This ceiling is consistent with imports during the period 2007–2009 when
imports reached this level (but then collapsed).
Initial ethanol point-of-production price (Jan. 2006) $1.50/gal During simulation, price varies to equilibrate supply and demand.
Minimum point-of-production price for cellulosic
capacity addition
$1.20/gal $2.40/gal For fully developed cellulosic industry. For initial-condition cellulosic industry.
Minimum point-of-production price for normal
cellulosic industry utilization
$1.00/gal $2.00/gal For fully developed cellulosic industry. For initial-condition cellulosic industry.
Distribution and storage cost $0.25/gal $0.05/gal Input assumption for intra-region, no infrastructure. Input assumption for
intra-region, with infrastructure.
Cost of moving ethanol from one region to another $0.10/gal Input assumption for movement between any two regions.
Transportation cost from distribution terminal to retail
station
$0.04/gal Input assumption for point-of-distribution to point-of-use delivery cost.
Cost per station of repurposing existing tankage
and equipment
$20,000 Existing mid-grade equipment repurposed for high-blend fuel storage
and dispensing.
Cost per station of new tankage and equipment $60,000 Purchase and installation of new equipment for high-blend fuel storage
and dispensing.
The table shows some of the major assumptions that are used in the model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t002
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require greater use of high-blend fuel in FFVs, conventional
gasoline vehicles certified to a higher ethanol content fuel, biofuels
other than ethanol that could be used in conventional gasoline
vehicles at shares greater than 10%, or completion of federal rule
revisions to allow up to 15% ethanol in gasoline. In the present
version of the Biomass Scenario Model, a vehicle module that
takes into account FFVs is used to estimate the potential for
ethanol use in light-duty vehicles. Different vehicle mixes are
explored as scenarios, but the vehicle module is not dynamically
linked, and therefore is unresponsive to modeled changes in
ethanol price.
In the sections below, we define each element of the
downstream supply chain, describe how it is represented in the
model (including interactions and limitations), and describe
policies that can be applied to each element and how those
policies are represented in the model.
Conversion
Conversion is the transformation of biomass feedstock into
biofuels. A full analysis of conversion using the Biomass
Scenario Model is underway, but detailed analysis of conversion
is not the focus of this study. For this study, we use a highly
simplified representation that constrains the growth of conver-
sion capacity while allowing for simple price feedbacks and per-
gallon subsidies at the point of production. This dynamic
coupling to the downstream modules allows conversion capacity
to grow in response to ethanol or other biofuel price and
demand. The simplified conversion module represents the
acquisition of production capacity for corn and cellulosic
ethanol in each of the 10 agricultural regions employed by
the Biomass Scenario Model.
There are several important aspects to the logic of this simplified
conversion module:
N It represents both corn and a single cellulosic pathway for
production of ethanol. (The more detailed conversion module
captures multiple cellulosic pathways.)
N A ‘‘ceiling’’ for cellulosic conversion capacity is set as a
scenario. This level is consistent with feedstock availability,
based on simulations from the feedstock supply module, which
is not included in the downstream model.
N Plant financials and investment decisions are captured
implicitly using a Bass diffusion formulation [18].
N Feedback from price drives capacity acquisition and utiliza-
tion.
N The model uses a highly simplified representation of learning
curve dynamics, in which the strength of price feedback on
industry growth is a function of installed conversion capacity.
Overall, then, the simplified conversion module represents
growth trajectories for conversion capacity that are consistent with
feedstock availability and responsive to price signals from
downstream. Thus, this downstream analysis does not address
questions, such as dynamics of changes in cost of production, that
would require the detail of the full conversion module.
Despite these limitations, the simplified conversion module
permits representation of relationships between ethanol or other
biofuel price and both the magnitude and the utilization of
conversion capacity. For example, an increase in consumption can
Figure 3. Ethanol distribution system. This conceptual view depicts the path of ethanol transport from biorefinery to dispensing station–the
ethanol distribution system. Storage capacity is included in the figure. Separation between ethanol and gasoline is generally maintained until the
distribution terminal. The distribution logistics module of the Biomass Scenario Model represents the distribution system and represents expansion of
that system due to supply push–in which supply of ethanol coming out of the biorefineries that is in excess of distribution capacity prompts greater
distribution capacity growth. Distribution within the production region (intra-region distribution) and from one production region to another (inter-
region distribution) is shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g003
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downstream module influences both the acquisition and the
utilization of capacity, which in turn changes ethanol production,
which feeds back to put a downward pressure on price.
Representing this feedback loop–an important market dynamic–
is a major purpose of the simplified conversion module. The point-
of-use ethanol price in the downstream model is set to cover costs
of delivering the fuel, plus an assumed markup (‘‘cost-plus’’
pricing). An alternative pricing representation would be to assume
that if ethanol costs (including subsidies) are below gasoline price,
that the ethanol price is set to match the gasoline price (market-
based pricing). A new version of the Biomass Scenario Model
allows for the user to choose how to represent point-of-use ethanol
price, with choices varying from the cost-plus price to the market-
based price. In addition to representing this feedback loop, the
simplified conversion module allows for dynamic relationships
among demand, interregional transport of biofuel, and relative
levels of conversion capacity utilization across regions. If demand
increases in a region with underutilized conversion capacity,
conversion in that region will ramp up and transport of biofuel
into that region will decline.
Policies to advance conversion range from research and
development to subsidies for conversion facilities. A full analysis
of these policies is beyond the scope of this paper on the
downstream system. In the downstream version of the model,
representation of incentives for conversion is limited to a point-of-
production subsidy. The point-of-production subsidy increases the
price of ethanol or other biofuel that the conversion sector
perceives, but does not directly affect fuel prices further
downstream. This increases the incentive for investment in
conversion capacity through the mechanisms described above by
providing greater returns on conversion investment and by
facilitating higher plant utilization rates at a given market price.
Inclusion of this subsidy in the downstream model serves as a
proxy for initiatives aimed at building industry capacity through
per-gallon subsidies. In the full conversion model, the same price
signal is used, but there it enters into an explicit calculation of the
conversion facility investment decision that also includes a broader
set of subsidies (feedstock, conversion facility output, and
investment).
Distribution Logistics
In our analysis, distribution logistics is the set of organizational
capabilities and infrastructure required to move biofuel from
conversion facility to dispensing station. Generally, distribution
logistics entails two steps: transportation from conversion facility to
distribution terminal, and transportation from distribution termi-
nal to dispensing station. The chemical characteristics of ethanol
complicate distribution logistics because ethanol generally cannot
be moved through pipelines used for petroleum products, stored in
the same tanks as petroleum products, or blended with gasoline to
make high-blend fuel until it is ready to be transported to the
dispensing station. Mitigation of these limits is being explored. For
purposes of this analysis, however, we assumed ethanol would
require its own infrastructure for these steps and that the
availability of high-blend fuels in the distribution system would
therefore depend on development of ethanol distribution infra-
structure–not just on development of operational and regional
conversion capacity [7].
In developing the distribution logistics module, the goal was to
explore implications of distribution infrastructure, despite substan-
tial uncertainty as to when, where, and with what component parts
the infrastructure might develop. Rather than attempt to model
detail about distribution infrastructure expansion, and then
explore many scenarios to account for uncertainty, we developed
a framework for capturing scenarios around the role of distribution
infrastructure within the larger system. These are expressed as (1)
different rates of infrastructure development based on evolution of
conversion system and (2) cost implications of the evolving
distribution infrastructure.
The distribution logistics module categorizes distribution
terminals as either possessing or not possessing the infrastructure
required to handle ethanol in high volumes. The module provides
a framework for estimating the costs of storage and transport of
ethanol, both within and across regions. As ethanol infrastructure
increases within a region, costs decrease for ‘‘importing’’ ethanol
from other regions, for storing ethanol within the region, and for
transporting ethanol within the region. The module is structured
such that additional ethanol supplies in a given region will increase
ethanol infrastructure penetration within that region first, and the
additional supply will then encourage ethanol infrastructure
additions in other regions (see Figure 3). This simplifying
assumption is an imperfect representation of market behavior
and could misrepresent regional flows when regional ethanol
prices make other patterns of distribution more profitable.
However, a more realistic representation was deemed overly
complex for this version of the model. The distribution logistics
module incorporates ‘‘supply push’’ pressure from the upstream
side that could cause distribution terminals to add ethanol
infrastructure capability.
We do not represent the economics around the infrastructure
investment decision. Instead, we simply assume that supply push
pressure drives the acquisition of infrastructure over time. This
rate of infrastructure acquisition is not instantaneous for a wide
range of financial and physical reasons. In the model, the assumed
rate of infrastructure acquisition can be changed to approximate
the effect of more or less favorable financial conditions for
investment, but any particular rate is not explicitly related to
financial assumption. The point-of-distribution subsidy can be
used to vary the constraints imposed by distribution infrastructure.
The 10-region structure of the Biomass Scenario Model permits
exploration of broad regional differences in ethanol distribution,
but does not permit exploration of distribution logistics below the
regional level. The model also represents ethanol or biofuel
imports, which are being explored in other analyses.
The primary interaction of the distribution logistics module with
upstream modules is the supply push mechanism by which excess
ethanol supplies motivate the acquisition of ethanol infrastructure
at distribution terminals. The modules farther downstream do not
directly feed price signals back to the distribution logistics module;
instead, those price signals influence production, which in turn
determines the amount of supply push. Because terminals that
acquire ethanol infrastructure are assumed to retain it, no
feedback is represented in the model that would cause terminals
to stop offering ethanol once they had started. The distribution
logistics module inputs to downstream modules by way of three
variables: the availability of ethanol within the distribution system,
a factor in the dispensing station owner’s decision to offer high-
blend fuel, and the cost of distribution, which is a component of
fuel price at point of use.
Policies that encourage investment in distribution infrastructure
could provide incentives that may be essential for its development.
In the downstream model, these policies are represented by a per-
gallon subsidy to storage within the distribution system–the
distribution and storage subsidy–and this lower cost is passed
down the supply chain, ultimately reducing point-of-use price to
consumers and possibly increasing demand.
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Approximately 120,000 dispensing stations (as of 2007) provide
ready access to vehicle fuel in most parts of the United States [19].
Dispensing stations obtain fuel by truck from the distribution
network, store it in underground tanks, and pump it into
consumers’ vehicles. Stations generally offer at least two grades
of gasoline. In addition, a third, mid-grade gasoline, as well as
diesel fuel, are widely available, and some dispensing stations offer
other alternative fuels (for more information on alternative fuel
availability, see http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/locator/
stations/).
Dispensing high-blend fuel requires significant investment at the
dispensing station, including costs related to fuel storage tanks,
pumps, management of legal and liability issues, and customer
communications. Of these, the tankage investment is the most
significant up-front issue, and stations can be categorized by the
type of tankage investment needed. Some stations may have three
different types of fuel tanks for gasoline–one for each grade.
Because pumps can blend low- and high-grade fuels to create mid-
grade fuels, the mid-grade tank at these stations can be repurposed
for high-blend ethanol fuel. A station that does not have a mid-
grade tank that it could repurpose would have to install a new tank
for high-blend fuel. Installing a new tank requires greater
investment than repurposing one [15]. Costs to obtain dispensing
infrastructure at a station could range from $2,500 at the lowest
(for repurposing) to $200,000 at the highest (for installing new
equipment in a high-cost location). Table 2 shows cost assump-
tions used in the model. Dispensing high-blend fuel offers station
owners little certainty of increased profit: profit on fuel sales is low
relative to profits on in-store inventory; increased sales of high-
blend fuel represent reduced sales of gasoline (overall, though not
necessarily for each station); and the effect of high-blend fuel
availability on in-store sales is uncertain.
The dispensing station module represents, in considerable
detail, the station owner’s choice to invest in high-blend ethanol
dispensing equipment. Because the model does not include vehicle
choice, this decision is not part of a dynamic interaction of
consumer vehicle choice, fuel availability, and distribution
capacity. Given that FFV owners are often unaware of their
vehicles’ flex-fueling capability and that FFV owners now refuel
with high-blend only 4% of the time [8], this interaction is unlikely
to be strong in the near term. The module first considers whether
an individual station owner has access to ethanol in the
distribution network. If so, the module represents the decision to
consider installing ethanol-dispensing equipment. The module
assumes that specific ownership categories (oil company owned,
branded independent, unbranded independent, and hyper-mart
stations) face different financial circumstances and market
decisions. The module divides stations into those with ‘‘repurpo-
sable’’ mid-grade tanks and those without.
A favorable net present value of the investment is a necessary
condition for consideration. Net present value is calculated in a
detailed pro forma that takes into account the expected net change
in revenue and the investment cost associated with the investment
in tankage and equipment. The calculation of change in revenue
included low-blend sales, high-blend sales, in-store sales, and sales
volume for each type of sale. The calculation of investment cost
includes investment subsidies for fixed capital investment and
repurposing subsidies, interest, taxes, and depreciation, and is
discounted at different rates representing changes in required rate
of return with change in depreciation or loan status. The point-of-
use subsidy improves the net present value by reducing the cost of
high-blend.
Other issues, such as competitive considerations, are also
represented. The station owner is represented as having perfect
knowledge of FFV ownership shares among current and prospec-
tive customers–a simplifying assumption. The module explicitly
calculates revenues from in-store sales, which account for a
substantial share of station revenues and profits. In our base model
assumptions, high-blend fuel, because of its lower energy content,
results in more frequent fuel stops and slightly higher in-store sales;
because this assumption is uncertain, we explore it in a sensitivity
analysis (see Behavior and Market Sensitivity Analysis Results).
Despite this detail, data to fully describe the station owner’s
decision process are limited, so the analysis incorporates sensitiv-
ities on several uncertain parameters. Other significant data
limitations include inputs for tankage cost estimates. Cost is
modeled as depending only on whether repurposing occurs or a
new tank is installed, whereas actual installed costs of high-blend
tankage are likely to depend significantly on other factors, such as
whether station configuration makes tank repurposing or new
purchase easy or difficult.
The dispensing station module, like the distribution logistics
module, interacts with other modules both by way of availability of
high-blend fuel within the distribution system and via price.
Greater availability of high-blend fuel dispensing capacity means
that, in the fuel utilization module, more FFV owners have the
option to choose high-blend. Retail pricing at the point-of-use is
calculated as the cost of delivering ethanol or other biofuel to the
dispensing station plus an assumed markup (‘‘cost-plus’’ pricing).
An alternative pricing representation would be to assume that if
biofuel costs (including subsidies) are below gasoline price, that the
biofuel price is set to match the gasoline price (market-based
pricing). A new version of the Biomass Scenario Model allows for
the user to choose how to represent point-of-use biofuel price, with
choices varying from the cost-plus price to the market-based price.
The model seeks an equilibrium between production and
consumption of biofuel in the entire supply chain without explicit
representation of a retail-level market. If retail demand increases,
lower inventory increases upstream price, ultimately feeding back
to retail price.
Because the station owners’ investment decision is represented
in more detail than conversion and distribution investments,
financial incentives for station owners can be represented in more
detail. Policy levers within the dispensing station module include a
subsidy for investment in new tanks (fixed capital investment
subsidy), a tank-repurposing subsidy (repurposing subsidy), and a
per-gallon subsidy to the price of fuel at point of use (point-of-use
subsidy). These modeled incentives mirror the types of incentives
that have been used to encourage industry growth.
Fuel Utilization and Vehicles
Combustion of ethanol or gasoline in light-duty vehicles is the
fuel utilization considered here, and other vehicles and fuels are
not considered. Low-blend ethanol fuel and high-blend ethanol
fuel involve different decision makers. For low-blend fuel,
utilization depends primarily upon the requirements for renewable
fuels and limits on low-blend ethanol content (10% by volume is
the current legal limit in the United States). The amount of
ethanol used if all gasoline were 10% ethanol by volume is referred
to as the ‘‘blend wall.’’ EPA estimates that the blend wall will be
reached in 2014; the exact timing depends upon the rate of
increase in ethanol use, the rate of decrease in gasoline use due to
the increasing fuel economy of the light-duty vehicle fleet, and
whether or not the legal limit for ethanol content is increased (e.g.,
to 15%). The blend wall does not apply to infrastructure-
compatible biofuels. In contrast to pervasive use of low-blend,
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requires the availability of vehicles that can burn the fuel, the
availability of fuel at the dispensing station, and consumers’
decisions to purchase the fuel. Current law allows high-blend E85
only in FFVs in the United States. Consumer fuel purchase
decisions appear to be heavily influenced by, but not entirely
dictated by, the price of high-blend compared with gasoline.
The model estimates consumer choice of high-blend ethanol
fuel. This estimate is made in the fuel utilization module of the
downstream model. This module receives two key inputs from
the dispensing station module: a vehicle scenario that determines
the share of high-blend-capable vehicles and the availability of
high-blend fuel at the dispensing station. It accounts for the
regulatory requirements encouraging use of low-blend fuel and
estimates consumer choice of high-blend. For FFV owners with
access to high-blend dispensing, the fuel utilization module models
consumer choice between high-blend and gasoline. Although
additional refinements might be more realistic, the module now
represents consumer decisions based on the price per unit energy
of fuel–not volume of fuel–and it assumes consumers have
complete knowledge of availability of high-blend fuel at dispensing
stations. Consumers are simplified into two categories: If gasoline
and high-blend fuel were identically priced on an energy basis and
available, regular users would choose high-blend fuel 80% of the
time, while occasional users would choose gasoline 80% of the time.
The Biomass Scenario Model does have a vehicle module,
although it is not dynamically coupled to the downstream model
for this study. The vehicle module does not incorporate consumer
vehicle choice but instead provides an accounting framework in
which to examine potential policy influences on vehicle stocks and
associated maximum potential ethanol utilization. The vehicle
module can generate policy scenarios that can be used in the
downstream model. The pattern over time of maximum ethanol
consumption potential under each scenario is an input to the
integrated downstream model.
Accordingly, the model in its current form does not represent
vehicle choice and related interactions and is limited in its
representation of consumer choice of fuel. It does not represent
dynamic interactions of fuel price and fuel availability with vehicle
choice, nor does it estimate effects of education and outreach
efforts on vehicle choice. Dynamic interactions could become a
more important consideration if FFVs were refueled with high-
blend a greater share of the time and if consumer choice played a
greater role in FFV purchase. The model also does not examine
consumer fuel choice among atypical consumers (e.g., those who
would pay a substantial premium or drive far out of their way to
obtain high-blend fuel or those who would decline high-blend fuel
under any circumstance). Within the current model structure,
because data on consumer fuel choice are limited, we conducted
sensitivity analysis on the assumptions about choices of regular
users and occasional users (see Behavior and Market Sensitivity
Analysis Results).
Policies related to fuel utilization include any policy that lowers
the price of ethanol at the pump relative to the price of gasoline
and to upstream ethanol prices. Such policies could include carbon
taxes or cap policies, gasoline taxes or floor prices, ethanol
subsidies or ceiling prices, or other incentives. In the downstream
model, these can be represented as gasoline taxes or high-blend
fuel subsidies. The increase in cost of high-blend fuel if a carbon
tax or a carbon cap policy were implemented would likely be
smaller than the increase in the cost of gasoline, although both
fuels emit carbon. The downstream model also includes a point-of-
use subsidy, which reduces ethanol price at the pump. Vehicle
policies–such as the Car Allowance Rebate System (Cash for
Clunkers), vehicle purchase incentives, FFV standards, and
efficiency standards–can be represented as different maximum
potential ethanol consumption scenarios in the downstream
model, based on outputs from the vehicle module.
Structural Summary of Downstream System
The downstream system exhibits the challenge of maintaining a
stable, competitive ethanol fuel market. Gasoline is the dominant
fuel in the light-duty vehicle market, and the cost of driving a
gasoline-fueled vehicle sets a ceiling above which alternative
vehicle-fuel systems are unlikely to compete for substantial market
share. On the supply side, ethanol at point of production must sell
at a price sufficient to compensate upstream market actors–
agribusiness, feedstock logistics operators, and ethanol conversion
facilities–for their investments and labor. Overall, the behavior of
the downstream system reflects the complex feedback between
supply and demand, which connect producers and consumers at
each stage of the supply chain.
The downstream system also demonstrates the need for
coordinated growth across the entire downstream supply chain.
Insufficient capacity at any link will inhibit growth of the market
overall, as indicated in the results in the Results and Discussion.
Different parts of the system respond to signals for investment with
different lag times, complicating the necessary coordination in
growth across the system.
Results and Discussion
We used the Biomass Scenario Model to explore how incentives
for market actors across the supply chain shape the potential for a
sustainable ethanol market in the United States. In this section, we
present the results of model runs of the downstream system that
were designed to explore these issues. A supporting information
file offers a data supplement (Data S1) that includes results of all of
the model runs that are presented here, as well as additional model
runs.
The results displayed in Figure 4 show simulated actual ethanol
consumption from several modeled cases: a ‘‘No Policy’’ case
without incentives (not even current incentives), a ‘‘Higher Market
and Infrastructure’’ case with higher levels of incentives, both on a
per-gallon basis and for infrastructure investments, and a ‘‘Lower
Market and Infrastructure’’ case with lower levels for these
incentives. Incentive levels for these cases are shown in Table 3.
Note that none of these cases is intended to represent continuation
of current policy. We recognize that the levels of policy
intervention explored in some of these cases are significant; this
paper does not advocate adoption of these particular policies, nor
do we assert that the results presented here are accurate
projections of the cost and effect of these policies. Instead, we
intend to explore the behavior of the system as modeled, seeking
insights on system behavior, not to predict specific numerical
results.
Also shown in the figure, for comparison, is an external dataset
that does not represent model results: The ‘‘EISA Legislated Total
Renewable Fuel Requirement’’ represents a growth trajectory that
would rise to the 36 billion gallons per year of biofuels utilization
by 2022 that is targeted in the legislation. The EPA Administrator
has discretion to reduce the required level if the targets proposed
by Congress cannot be met. Congress has not set production
targets for years beyond 2022. Ethanol fuel in light-duty vehicle
markets is only one of the pathways to meet this total requirement,
but the total is offered for reference here because the legislation
does not establish a total level of ethanol or a total amount of light-
duty vehicle biofuel.
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conditions, reaching ethanol consumption, even well below EISA-
legislated targets for renewable biofuels, appears to require policy
intervention with substantial overall financial implications. The
‘‘Maximum Consumption under Vehicle Base Case Scenario’’
uses the maximum potential ethanol consumption (i.e., ethanol
usage if all the flex-fuel vehicles use high-blend fuel exclusive-
ly)implied by a vehicle scenario–in this case, the number and type
of vehicles in Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy
Outlook reference scenario [20]. In Behavior and Market Sensitivity
Analysis Results, we explore how vehicle policy scenarios would
change this potential consumption of ethanol.
Figure 4. Scenarios for actual and potential ethanol consumption. The figure shows ethanol consumption results for all years from three
modeled scenarios: a No Policy case (i.e., no incentives), a Higher Market and Infrastructure Incentive case, and a Lower Market and Infrastructure
Incentive case. For comparison, results for maximum potential consumption ethanol consumption with a particular vehicle scenario are also shown
(Maximum Potential Consumption under Vehicle Base Case); the vehicle scenario is based on the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy
Outlook [20]. An external dataset, not representing model results, is also shown for comparison: the EISA Legislated Total Renewable Fuel
Requirement, which shows the goals of Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 for renewable fuel (not necessarily ethanol). The figure
illustrates that model results suggest that reaching EISA targets would require considerable incentives.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g004
Table 3. Summary of Incentives.
Policy Category Incentive Name
Range of Values
Considered Definition and Notes
Market Incentives Point-of-production subsidy $0/gal–$1/gal For cellulosic ethanol producers only.
Point-of-use subsidy $0/gal–$1/gal Lowers ethanol price at point of use. Fiscal effect increases with
increasing ethanol use.
Incremental gasoline cost $0/gal–$2/gal Represents any policy or market condition that differentially
increases gasoline price at point of use (e.g., carbon policy, high oil
price with little ethanol price response). As a tax, the fiscal effect
decreases with increasing ethanol use.
Infrastructure Incentives Distribution and storage
subsidy
$0/gal–$1/gal Subsidy for tankage and equipment at distribution terminals and for
distribution.
Repurposing subsidy 0%–75% Percentage of total cost that is subsidized. Subsidy for repurposing
of existing dispensing station infrastructure.
Fixed capital investment
subsidy
0%–75% Percentage of total cost that is subsidized. Subsidy for installation of
new dispensing station infrastructure.
The table summarizes the market and infrastructure incentives, the range of values for the incentives that are considered in the analysis, and further details about each
incentive.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t003
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sustain a high level of ethanol use: greater infrastructure
investment and more favorable market conditions are both needed
for a high level of ethanol use to occur. In other words, the No
Policy case results in insufficient investment in the distribution and
dispensing infrastructure to support widespread high-blend etha-
nol use, and also represents a market situation in which high-blend
ethanol is not competitive with gasoline fuel. The No Policy case is
defined by a set of inputs and a set of assumptions internal to the
model. Because the vehicle module is not dynamically coupled to
the downstream model, a vehicle scenario that specifies number of
vehicles, type of vehicles, and vehicle-miles of travel is part of the
input data. The amount of ethanol consumption declines in the
later years of the No Policy case because the vehicle scenario
assumes that increasing efficiency of the light-duty vehicle fleet
reduces low-blend ethanol consumption over time.
The substantial gap that emerges in later years between
modeled ethanol consumption, even in the Higher Market and
Infrastructure policy case, and the Maximum Consumption under
Vehicle Base Case Scenario reflects the numerous challenges that
impede penetration of high-blend ethanol fuel in the market.
These challenges may include resource and conversion costs that
result in uncompetitive pricing for high-blend ethanol fuel,
investment cost barriers leading to insufficient investment in
distribution and dispensing infrastructure for high-blend fuel, and
limitations on sales of high-blend fuel due to low market share of
FFVs or low rates of consumer purchase of high-blend fuel. Our
results suggest that these challenges might most effectively be
addressed through coordinated policy incentives across the supply
chain, and we explored market, infrastructure, and vehicle
incentives that might close this gap. High-blend-capable vehicles
will not always be fueled with high-blend; therefore, additional
high-blend-capable vehicles might be needed to approach the
legislative target, even for years when the Maximum Consumption
under Vehicle Base Case exceeds that target. To ensure that this
gap more likely is a characteristic of the system than a problem
with the model, we performed a number of tests on the model that
demonstrated that the gap can be closed if assumptions about
these challenges are altered.
Policy Analysis Results
The policy analysis results explore different policy design
choices, such as which incentives to apply, at what level, with
what revenue implications, and over what time period. The results
suggest that each section of the downstream supply chain
contributes to a functional whole, and so effective policy design
takes these interdependencies into account. To explore policy
design choices, we altered model inputs to represent effects of
different policies, without changing other inputs or calculations.
The policies are listed and defined in Table 3. The incentive levels
in the policy cases, each set at particular monetary values, are
summarized in Table 4. Some of these incentives would require
governmental subsidies, while others, notably the incremental
gasoline cost, could potentially be achieved through market
conditions (e.g., high oil price and breakthroughs in ethanol
production could result in higher incremental gasoline cost than
today). These incentives apply to different actors at different points
in the supply chain. We selected a range of incentive values to
model, to explore changes in system behavior under different
conditions. This does not imply endorsement of these incentive
values. We acknowledge that there will be a diversity of opinion as
to whether these incentive levels are politically feasible or fiscally
prudent, and we consider this discussion, along with related
comparisons of alternate public investments, to be beyond the
scope of this paper. The selected monetary values for each
incentive become an input to the model and influence the rate of
ethanol demand growth and the growth of its supply chain. The
results shown here illustrate the magnitude of these influences.
Market and Infrastructure Incentive Effects and Costs
Market and infrastructure incentives are two categories of
incentives that appear important to designing a policy environ-
ment in which ethanol consumption increases. We explore higher
and lower levels of market and infrastructure incentives. Market
incentives include subsidies at point of use and point of
production, as well as an incremental gasoline cost. A larger
market incentive could be caused by a variety of policies–a carbon
tax, a cap on petroleum, a gasoline tax, or an ethanol price
subsidy–or by changed market conditions that keep gasoline prices
above ethanol prices. For reference, emission cap levels for
greenhouse gases considered in 2009 in the United States would
lead to additional maximum cost–if passed through to end users–
ranging from $0.24–$0.84/gal of gasoline ($25–$86/ton CO2)i n
2011 dollars, according to a summary of several different studies
(reported in [21] as $0.21–$0.73/gal of gasoline in 2005 dollars.
Consumer Price Index calculator (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/
cpicalc.pl) and emissions factor from [22] were used for
conversions). Effect on cost of ethanol would depend on
greenhouse gas emissions rates for ethanol and how these
emissions were treated in the policy.
Infrastructure incentives include a distribution and storage
subsidy, a repurposing subsidy, and a fixed capital investment
subsidy.
We selected the Higher Market and Infrastructure Incentives
and the Lower Market and Infrastructure Incentives cases to show
a range of additional ethanol consumption over No Policy
conditions. We could have selected even higher incentive levels
but judged those to be less interesting due to their higher costs.
Both the Higher and Lower cases include all policies except an
incremental gasoline cost.
Market and infrastructure incentives appear to have a
synergistic interaction in the model. Table 5 shows model run
results that illustrate effects of different market and infrastructure
incentive levels on ethanol consumption (measured in billion
gallons per year) in 2022–selected because that year is called out in
EISA. Results are shown in columns that indicate whether Market
incentives, Infrastructure incentives, or Other incentives (either
none or a combination of Market and Infrastructure) are in place.
The rows below the ‘‘Higher market and infrastructure incentive
levels’’ row explore sensitivities on this case by applying its
incentive levels individually and in combination. This isolates the
effect of individual incentives. For the selected incentive levels,
ethanol consumption does not increase (relative to No Policy)
when each market or infrastructure incentive is applied by itself.
When all infrastructure incentives are applied together, it increases
somewhat, but does not increase when all market incentives are
applied (see Table 5). The Higher Market and Infrastructure
Incentives case shows synergy–a greater increase in ethanol
consumption with both infrastructure and market incentive levels
than the additive effect of each set of incentives alone. If the model
is a faithful representation of the actual system, this finding would
suggest that policy intervention across the supply chain is more
effective than a less comprehensive approach.
There are different incentive combinations that achieve similar
levels of ethanol consumption, indicating significant choice in
policy design targeting any particular goal. This is also shown in
Table 5, where lower market and infrastructure incentive levels
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consumption of 15 billion gal/year in 2022.
The effects of a given incremental investment in any single type
of incentive depend heavily upon the levels of other incentives and
the state of development of the system. This is illustrated in
Figure 5, which shows in the top row the effects (on ethanol
consumption in billion gallons per year over time) of Higher (left
column) and Lower (right column) Market and Infrastructure
Incentives at three different levels of incremental gasoline cost. In
the top row, four different lines can be observed, corresponding to
the No Policy case and $0.00, $0.50, and $1.00 per gallon
incremental gasoline cases for each column. With Lower Market
and Infrastructure Incentives (right column), changes in the
incremental gasoline cost increases ethanol consumption, whereas
at Higher Market and Infrastructure Incentive levels (left column),
the three lines at different incremental gasoline costs overlap,
indicating that little opportunity remains for a $1.00 incremental
gasoline cost to have additional impacts on ethanol consumption,
because the other incentives embodied in the Higher Market and
Infrastructure Incentive set have already increased consumption.
The lines with $0.00/gal incremental gasoline cost, appearing as
small, light-red dots, correspond to the Higher and Lower Market
and Infrastructure Incentives lines in Figure 4, and the 2022 values
of these lines for ethanol consumption–19 billion gallons per year
(Higher) and 15 billion gallons per year (Lower)–are shown in
Table 5.
Higher ethanol consumption levels are reached at significant
levels of incentive, and selection of incentive type determines the
revenue implications of those incentives. The second row of
Figure 5 (Cumulative Subsidy) illustrates the very different revenue
implications of different incentive choices. If incremental gasoline
costs occurred as a tax, it would generate revenues. This is shown
in the figure with green used to indicate positive revenues
generated (negative subsidy). The color scale treats incremental
gasoline cost as revenue and presents net subsidy as the sum of all
incentive costs or revenues. This is why the larger circles, which
have higher incremental gasoline costs, are greener. Looking at the
left-hand column, the first row shows that similar levels of ethanol
consumption are achieved, and the second row shows that this
similar level of consumption occurs with three very different
cumulative subsidy levels (as seen from the lines) and revenue
implications (as seen from the colors). This raises the possibility
that combinations of incentives could be selected to yield a desired
level of revenue or public cost. Another important contrast
Table 4. Incentive Levels in the No Policy and Policy Cases.
Policy Category Incentive Name
No Policy
Levels
Higher Market and
Infrastructure Levels
Lower Market and
Infrastructure Levels
Market Incentives Point-of-production subsidy $0/gal $1/gal $0.50/gal
Point-of-use subsidy $0/gal $1/gal $0.50/gal
Infrastructure Incentives Distribution and storage subsidy $0/gal $1/gal $0.50/gal
Repurposing subsidy 0% 75% 75%
Fixed capital investment subsidy 0% 75% 75%
The ‘‘No Policy Levels’’ correspond to Run 2804. Runs 3215, 3243, and 3269 have ‘‘Higher Market and Infrastructure Incentives’’ conditions with $0, $0.50, and $1/gal
incremental gasoline cost, respectively. Runs 3202, 6901, and 3256 have ‘‘Lower Market and Infrastructure Incentives’’ conditions with $0, $0.50, and $1/gal incremental
gasoline cost, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t004
Table 5. Incentive Effect on Ethanol Consumption in 2022.
Name of Case Ethanol Consumption by Category of Incentive (billion gal/yr)
Run Market Infrastructure Other
No policy 2804 13
Lower market and infrastructure incentive levels 3202 15
Higher market and infrastructure incentive levels 3215 19
Point-of-production subsidy 7146 13
Point-of-use subsidy 7144 13
All market incentives at levels in Higher case 7152 13
Repurposing subsidy 2836 13
Distribution and storage subsidy 7145 13
Fixed capital investment subsidy 2820 13
All infrastructure incentives at levels in Higher case 3195 15
This table summarizes model results for ethanol consumption in 2022. Run refers to model run numbers and can be used to identify corresponding results in the
supporting information (Data S1). Runs are grouped into three different categories, shown in columns, depending upon whether Market or Infrastructure incentives are
in place. Incentives are applied individually and in combination at ‘‘Higher Market and Infrastructure Incentives’’ levels for the single and multiple policy cases, except for
the ‘‘Lower Market and Infrastructure Incentives’’ case which applies all incentives in combination. The ‘‘Other’’ Category includes cases without incentives (No policy),
as well as two cases that combine Market and Infrastructure incentives. The rows below the ‘‘Higher market and infrastructure incentive levels’’ row explore sensitivities
on this case by applying its incentive levels individually and in combination.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t005
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policies is the declining need for intervention via gasoline taxes if
the ethanol share increases, in contrast to the increasing
intervention if ethanol subsidies are used. This is evident in the
changes of color over time. These results are not intended to
suggest that this level of gasoline tax is desirable, but instead to
illustrate the different revenue implications of alternative policy
mechanisms for increasing ethanol use.
Cost effectiveness is crucial to successful policy, in particular at
the levels of investment that appear necessary to reach a sustained
ethanol market. The third row of Figure 5 shows one measure of
cost effectiveness. Cumulative costs of policy incentives are divided
by incremental annual production capacity relative to the No
Policy case, yielding Capacity Expansion Cost-Effectiveness in
dollars per gallon-year (higher values imply lower cost effective-
ness). This metric should not be confused with the cost of
incentives per additional gallon of ethanol. Instead, it is a measure
of investment in annual production capacity in the development of
the industry. The relative value in different cases, and the trends
over time in this metric, suggests greater or lesser cost effectiveness
of incentives as an investment in industry transformation. This
metric treats incremental gasoline cost as cost, not revenue, to
provide a better indication of the overall economic intervention of
each package of incentives. This is why Figure 5 shows that cases
with higher incremental gasoline costs have higher costs per
gallon-year of production achieved. Not surprisingly, the figure
illustrates that certain combinations of incentives appear more cost
effective than others, and reaching higher levels of ethanol
production is associated with use of less cost-effective incentives
(higher values).
The choice of types and levels of incentives, resulting ethanol
consumption, and associated costs and cost effectiveness are
diverse. Figure 6 illustrates results for a larger set of combinations
in a single year, 2030. The three columns of results, like the three
rows of Figure 5, show ethanol consumption, incentive costs, and
cost effectiveness. As in Figure 5, the cumulative net subsidy color
scale shows government payments or revenues generated,
assuming that incremental gasoline costs are revenue in the form
of gasoline taxes. The green points have $0.50/gal gasoline tax;
the red ones have $0.00/gal gasoline tax. The distance between
these two points varies for the different rows. This shows how
significantly the effect of an incremental $0.50/gal gasoline tax
can vary, depending on other incentive levels, indicating once
more that effects of a given incremental investment in any single
type of incentive depend heavily upon the levels of other
incentives and the state of development of the system. Again,
the authors do not advocate a particular policy or level of
Figure 5. Ethanol consumption, incentive costs, and cost effectiveness with three incremental gasoline costs. The figure shows model
results for all years under different policy and incremental gasoline cost conditions. The left-hand column shows results under Higher Market and
Infrastructure Incentive conditions, while the right-hand column shows results under Lower Market and Infrastructure Incentive conditions. Three
levels of incremental gasoline costs are represented with three different sizes of marks. The cumulative net subsidy color scale shows government
payments or revenues generated, assuming that incremental gasoline costs are revenue in the form of gasoline taxes. The top row shows ethanol
consumption over time; the middle row shows cumulative subsidy (with incremental gasoline costs treated as a subsidy and added to other costs,
rather than being subtracted as they were for the cumulative net subsidy scale); the bottom row shows a metric of effectiveness of investment in
annual production capacity–Capacity Expansion Cost Effectiveness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g005
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of the system.
These results for market and infrastructure incentives illustrate
the importance of a balanced set of incentives, the potential
interchangeability among incentives, and the opportunity to select
a desired set of incentives based on consumption, revenue, and
other considerations. Next, we consider the effects of the duration
of incentives.
Sunset Runs
Determining when a policy intervention should terminate is an
important element of policy design. In the policy cases, we applied
policies throughout the analysis period. Here, we show the results
of an analysis of the effect of the timing of policy termination, or
sunset. This analysis shows that the model estimates precipitous
market decline in the absence of the policy conditions (see
Figure 7). This does not imply that the market requires indefinite
continuation of policy intervention. To explore the question of
what policy intervention portfolio could most effectively establish a
self-sustaining market, further analysis would be required of
duration, combinations, magnitudes of policy intervention. In this
analysis, we did not vary the duration of each policy independently
of the other policies or explore the diversity of possible
combinations and sequences. For example, we did not terminate
infrastructure policies earlier than market policies to assess
whether infrastructure policies alone can be phased out after
infrastructure development reaches a threshold level, without
triggering precipitous market decline. In Figure 7, different lines
that have the same policy expiration year represent different
combinations of polices. The highest line represents the Lower
Market and Infrastructure Incentives case with $2.00/gal incre-
mental gasoline cost, up to the expiration year, while the lines
below it have some of the policies turned off during all years.
Further analysis would be required to determine whether certain
policies could be terminated before others without reducing
consumption. Such tests are beyond the scope of this paper but
could explore whether infrastructure policies can be terminated
once infrastructure penetration reaches a certain share, and after
that an end-use price differential alone (whether the result of policy
intervention or market conditions) would be sufficient to sustain
the market.
In Figure 7, the market appears to collapse the year of the
expiration date because there is a single point for each year, and
the expiration date year is calculated with the policy absent. The
downstream model does not include sufficient detail about the
conversion investment decision to estimate the effect of anticipated
policy sunset on conversion facility investment decision, so this
version of the model effectively assumes that investment decisions
are made based on current conditions. More detailed modeling of
these decisions would likely cause market decline to start
Figure 6. Ethanol consumption, incentive costs, and cost effectiveness of multiple incentive combinations with two incremental
gasoline costs in 2030. The figure shows model results for 2030 under different policy and incremental gasoline cost conditions. Two levels for
incremental gasoline costs are represented with two different sizes of marks. Policy conditions include three levels of Distribution and Storage
Subsidy, one level of Fixed Capital Investment (FCI) Subsidy, two levels of high-blend (Hi-Blend) Point-of-use (PoU) Subsidy, two levels of Point-of-
production (PoP) Subsidy, and one level of Repurposing Subsidy. The cumulative net subsidy color scale shows government payments or revenues
generated, assuming that incremental gasoline costs are revenue in the form of gasoline taxes. The left-hand column of results shows ethanol
consumption over time; the middle column shows cumulative subsidy (with incremental gasoline costs treated as a subsidy and added to other costs,
rather than being subtracted as they were for the cumulative net subsidy scale); the right-hand column of results shows a metric of effectiveness of
investment in annual production capacity–Capacity Expansion Cost Effectiveness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g006
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in the 2020 and 2025 sunset cases) occur because there is ethanol
inventory that will be consumed once its price drops.
Behavior and Market Sensitivity Analysis Results
We explored effects of changes in the base model inputs and
assumptions through a series of sensitivity analyses. The sensitivity
cases included modifications to assumptions about market actor
behaviors, input data about various costs, and vehicle scenario
inputs. In Figure 8, we show the effect of different vehicle scenarios
on potential and simulated actual ethanol consumption. These
vehicle scenarios are not connected to existing or proposed policy,
but illustrate the response of the model to hypothetical policy
interventions. The gap between potential and simulated actual
ethanol consumption reflects that high-blend fuel is not always
used by high-blend-capable vehicles, for a variety of reasons.
The Cash for Clunkers ramp scenario (CFC Ramp) illustrates
the effect of ramping in a Cash for Clunkers incentive over time to
increase the rates of retirement of old vehicles and purchase of new
vehicles. Because the percentage of FFVs is assumed to be greater
in new vehicles than in the total fleet, an increase in fleet turnover,
such as the CFC Ramp scenario, leads to a greater share of FFVs
in the total fleet and a modest increase in potential ethanol
consumption relative to the Vehicle Base Case. The FFV doubling
scenario (FFVs 26) shows a more aggressive penetration of FFVs
and a correspondingly greater increase in potential consumption,
where their share of purchases in each time period is assumed to
double compared to Vehicle Base Case rates for that period,
insofar as possible. While additional FFV penetration alone does
not achieve higher ethanol use, it does lift the maximum potential
ethanol consumption and enable higher levels of use when other
conditions are favorable.
The base model contains a particular set of assumptions about
behaviors or circumstances of various market actors with regard to
the risk of using biofuels or investing in biofuel technology. Risk
aversion is a key issue for new technologies but can be very difficult
to estimate. The assumptions used here are based upon the view
that people tend to be risk averse in making large investments. The
results highlight the importance of these assumptions, but we do
not assert that the quantification of these assumptions is exactly
correct.
In Figure 9, we show market sensitivity cases with base model
assumptions adjusted to reflect different levels of risk aversion in
market actor behavior. The Flagship case uses the base model
assumptions, and the other cases show adjustments to these
assumptions as summarized in Table 6. Risk-averse behavior leads
to lower ethanol use; aggressive behavior leads to greater ethanol
use. These sensitivities represent the considerable uncertainty
about the behavior of various market players in response to risk,
and the substantial effect those behaviors can have on the ethanol
market. If market actors are more risk averse, policy intervention
(or favorable market conditions) will result in much less ethanol
consumption than if market actors tolerate more risk.
Five different market actor behaviors were found to have
substantial effects. Two of these were consumer behaviors (model
variable names are ‘‘Occasional User Price Attractiveness
Weighting’’ and ‘‘Regular User Price Attractiveness Weighting’’)
that address how occasional ethanol users and regular ethanol
users responded to ethanol price. Two were dispensing station
owner behaviors (in the model, these are two functions called
Figure 7. Effect of policy sunset on ethanol consumption. The figure shows ethanol consumption results for all years, with the entire set of
policies terminated in the color-coded year. Different lines that have the same policy expiration year represent different sets of policies; however, we
did not independently vary the policy duration. The figure shows that the market declines precipitously in the absence of policy intervention, under
modeled conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g007
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and repurposed tankage, respectively) that address the likelihood
that a station owner would invest in a new tank or in repurposing
an old tank in order to offer high-blend. One addresses conversion
capacity investment behavior (in the model, this is a function
called ‘‘Impact of Price on Cellulosic Growth Rate.’’), measuring
the responsiveness of upstream investment to ethanol price.
The four different cases are constructed from combinations of
these varying levels of risk aversion in market actor behavior. The
‘‘Risk Averse’’ case is the combination of greater risk aversion,
relative to the base model, across all five market behaviors and
assumes that access of FFVs to high-blend fuel is worse than in the
base model. (In the model, this is a function called ‘‘Frac HiBlend
Capable with Station Coverage.’’) The ‘‘Flagship’’ case represents
the same level of risk aversion as found in the base model used in
the policy analysis. The ‘‘Aggressive-Repurposing’’ case is an
aggressive case for repurposing, in which station owners are more
likely to invest in repurposing than in the base model. The
‘‘Aggressive’’ case assumes that station owners are more likely to
invest in new tanks and that conversion capacity investors are
more responsive to ethanol price than in the base model. These
market sensitivities show how significantly risk and risk perception
could affect adoption of high-blend fuel.
Regional Effects
The Biomass Scenario Model divides the United States into 10
regions, according to the agricultural regions used by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. These regions include so-called
Appalachian states, Corn Belt states, Delta states, Lake states,
Mountain states, Northeast states, Northern Plains states, Pacific
states, Southeast states, and Southern Plains states. This division
permits the model to be used to analyze whether a regional
strategy, which would target particular regions with significantly
higher levels of incentive, could achieve higher ethanol market
penetration. For this paper we did not analyze such a strategy, nor
did we evaluate whether regional strategies might enhance cost
effectiveness. Regional issues merit further analysis using the fully
integrated model.
Results Summary and Future Work
Overall, the results of our downstream analysis show that
driving ethanol to high levels of market penetration would require
substantial subsidies, if model conditions hold. A high penetration
of ethanol requires both infrastructure availability and persistently
favorable market conditions across the entire supply chain.
Favorable market conditions can be achieved either through
subsidies or technological improvements that establish relatively
low ethanol fuel prices or through incremental gasoline costs,
which could represent either a gasoline tax or market conditions
that create relatively high gasoline prices without corresponding
high ethanol prices (see Table 2 for base model price conditions).
Considerable uncertainty about behavioral and market conditions
leads to a range of potential ethanol penetration scenarios. Our
results suggest that incentives or altered market conditions must be
sustained to ensure long-term market stability. These downstream
results necessarily neglect the effect of improvements upstream and
thus cannot address how robust technology improvement might
reduce the need for incentives.
Figure 8. Vehicle scenarios. The figure shows maximum potential ethanol consumption and simulated actual ethanol consumption results for all
years under different vehicle scenarios. The Cash for Clunkers ramp scenario (CFC Ramp) increases the rates of retirement of old vehicles and
purchase of new vehicles. The flex-fuel vehicles doubling scenario (FFVs 26) shows ethanol consumption if the share of purchases of FFVs in each
time period is assumed to double compared to the base case rate for that period, insofar as possible. FFV penetration alone does not achieve higher
ethanol use, but it does lift the maximum potential ethanol consumption and enable higher levels of use when other conditions are favorable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g008
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will expand on this initial analysis of the downstream portion of
the supply chain. These future analyses will further explore what
policies and combinations of policies appear most effective at
establishing an economically sustainable biofuel industry, improv-
ing the effectiveness of upstream subsidies in prompting growth
throughout the system, minimizing possible unintended conse-
quences, and reducing the overall cost of incentives. Ongoing
development of the Biomass Scenario Model also enables analysis
of the cost of infrastructure-compatible (‘‘fungible’’) fuels–such as
biomass-based gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel–relative to
ethanol along with an assessment of the potential competition
between multiple biofuels pathways and products.
Conclusions
Our analysis addressed several major questions (see Introduc-
tion). In answer to these questions, we found that an economically
sustainable domestic ethanol fuel distribution, dispensing, and
Figure 9. Market assumptions sensitivity. The figure shows ethanol consumption results for all years with differing model assumptions for
market actor behavior. The Aggressive cases use two different sets of behavioral assumptions that are more favorable to ethanol consumption, while
the Risk Averse case uses a set of behavioral assumptions that is less favorable to ethanol consumption. The Flagship case has the same behavioral
assumptions that are used in the rest of the analysis. These sensitivities demonstrate the considerable uncertainty about the behavior of various
market players and the substantial effect those behaviors can have on the ethanol market.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.g009
Table 6. Summary of Market Assumptions Sensitivity Cases.
Variable or Function
Changed R
Occasional User
Price Response
Regular User Price
Response
Station Owner
Investment
(New Tank)
Station Owner Investment
(Repurpose Old Tank)
Conversion Capacity
Investment Price
Response
Case Name and Run Q
Aggressive (7009) Base Base Aggressive Base Aggressive
Aggressive – Repurposing
(7006)
Base Base Base Aggressive Base
Flagship (6901) Base Base Base Base Base
Risk Averse (6650) Risk Averse Risk Averse Risk Averse Risk Averse Risk Averse
This table shows how the different market actor behaviors were combined into four different cases. Case Name corresponds to the names used in Figure 9, and Run
refers to the run number, which may be used to view run results in the supporting information file (Data S1). Occasional User Price Response and Regular User Price
Response represent consumer behaviors that address how occasional ethanol users and regular ethanol users responded to ethanol price. The model variable names
are ‘‘Occasional User Price Attractiveness Weighting’’ and ‘‘Regular User Price Attractiveness Weighting.’’ Station Owner Investment (New Tank) and Station Owner
Investment (Repurpose Old Tank) represent dispensing station owner behaviors that reflect the likelihood that a station owner would invest in a new tank or in
repurposing an old tank in order to offer high-blend. In the model, these are two functions called ‘‘Investment ‘Hit Rate’’’ and ‘‘Investment ‘Hit Rate’ (RP)’’ for new and
repurposed tankage, respectively. Conversion Capacity Investment Price Response represents conversion capacity investment behavior, measuring the responsiveness
of upstream investment to ethanol price. In the model, this is called, ‘‘Impact of Price on Cellulosic Growth Rate.’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t006
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intervention or significant change from current market conditions.
Results suggest that, with sufficient policy intervention (or
sufficient market change) across the supply chain, the policy goals
could be achieved. When assumptions about consumer behavior
and system behavior differ, these conclusions generally persist,
although substantially different assumptions affect the level of
investment in incentives that would be required to develop and
sustain an ethanol fuel system.
Our analysis of the downstream portion of the biofuels supply
chain shows that, under the assumptions we used, substantial
policy intervention or altered market conditions are required to
support development of a sustainable ethanol-fuel supply chain in
the United States. The conditions in the downstream system that
enable the development of a substantial and sustained ethanol
market include:
N Competitive pricing of ethanol (or other biofuel) relative to
gasoline;
N Sufficient biofuel producer payment;
N Robust investment in infrastructure across the entire supply
chain;
N Widespread use of high-blend fuel in FFVs.
The business-as-usual assumptions do not have these conditions,
and a robust and sustained ethanol market does not develop. More
favorable market conditions or emergence of competitively priced
infrastructure-compatible biofuel could reduce or eliminate the
policy intervention necessary, but are beyond the scope of this
paper.
A combination of policies encouraging infrastructure investment
and policies supporting favorable market conditions appears to be
most effective in establishing an economically sustainable,
domestic ethanol fuel supply chain. An incremental gasoline cost
might occur without government intervention under certain
market conditions, or would generate revenue if implemented as
a gasoline tax and could partially substitute for other market
incentives. Favorable assumptions about the behavior of market
actors lead to a lesser need–but do not eliminate the need–for
policy intervention or market changes. The Vehicle Base Case
scenario is unlikely to achieve the EISA goal using ethanol in light-
duty vehicles alone, unless an improbably large share of FFV
owners were able to utilize high-blend fuel, but alternative vehicle
scenarios with greater FFV penetration might do so. Results of our
downstream analysis identify potential issues in achieving existing
goals and can inform selection of other goals, considering the
system conditions necessary for their achievement and the
estimated cost of supporting policies. Key insights and conclusions
are shown in Table 7, along with conditions that would support or
alter these findings. The modeling work shows (given assumptions):
N Levels and duration of favorable market conditions required
for ethanol to penetrate the market;
N Levels of incentives needed to prompt significant infrastructure
investment;
N Infrastructure investment is not readily encouraged through
point-of-use price differential alone;
N Improved efficacy of coordinated incentives compared to
interventions at a single point of the supply chain;
Table 7. Summary of Insights and Conclusions, along with Mitigating Conditions.
System Property Key Supporting Factors Contradicting Conditions
Ongoing favorable market conditions, created by
some combination of high-blend point-of-use
subsidy and incremental gasoline cost, are needed
for sustained use of high levels of ethanol.
Market actors desire continual financial benefit
relative to gasoline to produce, provide, and
use fuel.
If ethanol costs turn out to be lower relative to
gasoline costs than we assume, or if consumers
were more willing to pay extra for non-gasoline fuel
with less financial benefit, demand would
be greater.
Substantial incentives are needed for
infrastructure investment in distribution and
dispensing to occur.
Assumed cost of capital and expected
return on infrastructure investment limit interest
in these investments.
Lower cost of capital and greater expected
return on infrastructure investment would
increase investment
An incremental gasoline cost can more readily
substitute for market incentives than for
infrastructure investment incentives. (Incremental
gasoline cost might occur without government
intervention under some market conditions.)
An incremental gasoline cost helps establish a
sustained difference between gasoline cost
and ethanol cost, which is necessary for the
ethanol market to grow and persist.
An incremental gasoline cost would substitute less
well for market incentives if it were not
passed up the supply chain to provide market
incentives to dispensing stations, distributors, and
producers. It could substitute for infrastructure
investment incentives if it affected cost of capital and
expected return on investment.
Incentives are most effective when applied
at several points in the supply chain.
Multiple bottlenecks occur across the
supply chain.
If several bottlenecks were resolved through
technological or other approaches, fewer
incentives would be needed.
Levels of ethanol market targeted in EISA
goals penetration would require tens of billions
of dollars per year in incentives (Figure 5).
Both infrastructure incentives and ongoing
market incentives are needed to develop and
sustain an ethanol market, and these
incentives must be set at certain levels to
overcome challenges.
If the challenges to infrastructure and market
growth are easier to overcome than estimated,
either due to behavior or cost differences
between modeling assumptions and reality, cost of
incentives would decline.
The Annual Energy Outlook reference vehicle
scenario would not have sufficient FFVs to
achieve EISA goals.
If all FFVs in the reference vehicle scenario
always used high-blend fuel, ethanol usage
would achieve the goal, but 100% use
is highly unlikely.
High availability of high-blend fuel and strong
market incentives (e.g., relatively low price) could
increase its usage in FFVs. Alternatively, greater
penetration of FFVs could help
reach the goal.
The table summarizes insights that can be gained from the analysis, identifies the factors that support the validity of each insight, and conditions that might cause each
insight not to hold. Analytic results are best understood as conditional, and this table summarizes the conditions under which insights of the study are likely to be valid.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035082.t007
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insufficient for ethanol markets to reach EISA goals.
Our analysis of the downstream ethanol supply chain using the
Biomass Scenario Model provides preliminary insights regarding
both key elements of the downstream vehicle system and how
policy incentives could shape the development of sustained and
significant ethanol fuel use in the United States to meet policy
goals. These insights may be useful in shaping future goals and the
policies to achieve them. We are pursuing additional analysis on
other parts of the biofuels supply chain and are developing an
analysis based on the full end-to-end Biomass Scenario Model.
Supporting Information
Data S1 Supporting information is provided in a
Microsoft Access Database (2003). This database contains
seven tables. The ‘‘Additional_Runs’’ table provides results for
incremental gasoline costs in addition to those used in the figures.
The following four tables (Data_Figure_4, Data_Firgure_5&6,
Data_Figure_7&8, Data_Figure_9) contain model run results that
were used in figures 4 through 9. The ‘‘EISA’’ table contains Total
Renewable Fuel Requirement data from the regulation imple-
menting EISA (Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 58, Friday, March
26, 2010), and does not represent model results. The ‘‘Key_-
to_Runs_Figures’’ summarizes which runs were used in which
figure. The result provided is national consumption, either actual
or maximum, of ethanol or gasoline in flex-fuel or conventional
vehicles over 25 years (2006–2030), resulting in 100 records per
run. (Actual and maximum gasoline consumption are the same
and actual ethanol consumption is not divided by vehicle type.)
The supplemental data is an aggregation and summary of a much
larger database that retains additional metrics besides national
consumption from each run, as well as data on runs not included.
(ZIP)
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